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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State of Idaho appeals the District Court's Memorandum and Decision and Order, 
filed January 14, 2014, reversing the decision of the Magistrate Court to summarily dismiss 
Mr. Keserovic's Post-Conviction Petition and remanding the case for the Magistrate Court to 
hold an evidentiary hearing. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On or about January 6, 2012, Mr. Haris Keserovic, a non-citizen, was arrested in Ada 
County for the crime of Grand Theft, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 18-2407(1). A case was filed on 
January 9, 2012, bearing Ada County Case No. CR-FE-2012-0000311. On January 10, 2012, 
Mr. Jeffrey McKinnie, a licensed attorney practicing in Boise, Idaho, filed a Notice of 
Appearance on behalf of Mr. Keserovic. A Preliminary Hearing was waived on March 12, 2012, 
and the case was bound over to District Court. Mr. Keserovic was arraigned on an Information 
charging him with the crime of Grand Theft on April 4, 2012, and a not guilty plea was entered. 
The case was set for Pre-Trial Conference on June 20, 2012, and Jury Trial on June 25, 2012. 
Mr. Keserovic filed a Notice pursuant to I.C. § 19-519 and Idaho Criminal Rule 12.1 on 
April 25, 2012, asserting an alibi defense. A Stipulation to Continue the Jury Trial was filed on 
May 10, 2012, and after a hearing on May 16, 2012, the Jury Trial was rescheduled to July 16, 
2012. At a hearing held on June 20, 2012, the case was remanded to the Magistrate Court 
pursuant to an offer from the State for Mr. Keserovic to plead guilty to the misdemeanor crime of 
Petit Theft pursuant to LC. § 18-2407(2). On the advice of counsel, Mr. Keserovic signed a 
written plea agreement pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 11 (f)(l )(C), indicating he would plead guilty to 
Petit Theft, and agreed to specific sentence as an appropriate disposition of the case. The 
sentence agreed upon consisted of a 365-day jail sentence, with 305 days suspended for a period 
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of 2 years on supervised probation. The remainder of the jail sentence would be served in jail or 
in a work release program, if available. Fines and court costs were also included as a term of the 
agreement. On June 26, 2012, Mr. Keserovic entered a guilty plea, was convicted of a violation 
ofI.C. § 18-2407(2) and sentenced pursuant to the Rule 11 agreement. 
On or about September 10, 2012, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (hereinafter 
"ICE") assumed custody of Mr. Keserovic. He was held without bail pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(c)(l)(B). On September 26, 2012, Mr. Keserovic filed a Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief seeking relief from the judgment of conviction entered in CR-FE-2012-0000311, and 
requested a new trial and/or other appropriate relief. (R. at 5). Mr. Keserovic claimed that 
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by providing inaccurate advice regarding the 
immigration consequences of pleading guilty to a violation of I.C. § 18-2407(2) with a 365-day 
sentence, and that such advice prejudiced Mr. Keserovic. Additionally, Mr. Keserovic asserted 
that the State and the Court's attempt to alert Mr. Keserovic to the possible immigration 
consequences of a plea to Petit Theft did not cure the prejudice he suffered from counsel's 
deficient performance. 
The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief informed the Court that Mr. Keserovic was a 
native and citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina who had been lawfully residing in the United States 
since 1998. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed 9/26/12, p.1 (hereinafter "PCR"). (R. at 
225). He fled Bosnia as a refugee in the wake of the Bosnian War. Id. He was admitted to the 
United States as a young boy and subsequently adjusted his status to that of a Lawful Permanent 
Resident (hereinafter "LPR"). Id. Mr. Keserovic's parents reside lawfully in the United States, as 
do his two younger brothers, and he is the father of a four-year old U.S. citizen son. Id. 
Additionally, Mr. Keserovic has extended family throughout the United States including an aunt 
and numerous cousins. Id. 
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According to the PCR and attached affidavits, Mr. Keserovic informed Mr. McKinnie 
about his citizenship status as a non-citizen, and they discussed possible immigration 
consequences of a criminal conviction on more than one occasion. Id. See also Affidavit of Haris 
Keserovic, p.1 (R. at 26) and Affidavit of Jeffrey McKinnie, p.1 (R. at 28). Mr. Keserovic was 
visited by an immigration officer while he was in the custody of the Ada County Jail who told 
him that he would be deported if he was convicted of a felony offense. Affidavit of Keserovic, p. 
1. (R. at 26). Mr. Keserovic passed this information on to his counsel, Mr. McKinnie. Id. 
Mr. McKinnie subsequently advised Mr. Keserovic of the offer to plead guilty to a misdemeanor 
petit theft, and advised him to take the offer. Id. See also Affidavit of McKinnie, p.1. (R. at 28). 
He told Mr. Keserovic that he "wouldn't have any problems with immigration and that within 
sixty (60) days [he] would have [his] life back." Affidavit ofKeserovic, p.l. (R. at 26). 
During the plea colloquy and sentencing hearing, the State's attorney and the Court both 
advised Mr. Keserovic that pleading guilty to the crime of petit theft subjected him to possible 
deportation. PCR, p.3. (R. at 7). Mr. Keserovic leaned over to counsel, Mr. McKinnie, and 
inquired about such consequences, to which Mr. McKinnie replied, "They are just trying to scare 
you." Affidavit of Haris Keserovic, p. l. (R. at 26). According to Mr. Mc Kinnie's affidavit, the 
State's attorney stated on the record that because the charge was a theft offense with a one year 
sentence, that Mr. Keserovic would be pleading guilty to a felony. Affidavit of McKinnie, p.l. 
(R. at 28). Mr. McKinnie informed Mr. Keserovic that he was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor, 
not a felony. Id. Based upon counsel's advice, Mr. Keserovic continued with his guilty plea to 
the offense of petit theft as outlined in the Rule 11 agreement. 
The State filed an Answer (R. at 32) and a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 25, 
2012 (R. at 54). Mr. Keserovic filed an Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Disposition on November 5, 2012. (R. at 80). Subsequent to a hearing on the State's Motion for 
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Summary Dismissal held on December 13, 2012, the Court entered an Order Granting Summary 
Dismissal of Post-Conviction Motion Relief on January 28, 2013. (R. at 93). The Magistrate 
Court found that trial counsel's performance was deficient, but summarily dismissed the Petition 
because the Court believed that Mr. Keserovic was adequately advised by the Court and 
Prosecutor of the immigration consequences at his entry of plea. (R. at 96). The Magistrate Court 
did not address the issue of prejudice except to say that "whatever deficiency or prejudice 
existed ... was cured" by the Court and the State's admonitions. Id. A Judgment of Dismissal was 
entered on February 22, 2013. (R. at 100). Mr. Keserovic appealed the Court's Order granting 
summary dismissal and denying post-conviction relief and the Judgment of Dismissal.1 The 
District Court reversed the Magistrate Court's summary dismissal and remanded the case for the 
Magistrate Court to hold an evidentiary hearing. (R. at 225). The District Court held that the 
Magistrate Court erred when it determined that Mr. Keserovic had been adequately advised 
regarding the immigration consequences of his guilty plea and when it failed to address whether 
there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the prejudice prong. Id. The State now 
appeals the District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order. 
1 After proceedings in Federal Court, and during the pendency of Post-Conviction proceedings in this case, 
Mr. Keserovic was deported pursuant to his guilty plea in CR-FE-2012-0000311, as the plea resulted in a conviction 
ofa crime defined by immigration laws as an "aggravated felony." 8 U.S.C. § l 10l(a)(43)(G). 
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ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Was the District Court correct when it reversed the Magistrate Court's summary dismissal of 
Mr. Keserovic's Post-Conviction Petition and remanded the case to the Magistrate Court to hold 
an evidentiary hearing? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Decided The Issue Presented On Appeal When It Reversed The 
Magistrate Court's Summary Dismissal Of Mr. Keserovic's Post-Conviction Petition For Relief 
And Remanded For Evidentiary Hearing Because Mr. Keserovic Presented The Court With A 
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact And Provided Admissible Evidence Supporting His Claims 
A Introduction 
In January 2013, Mr. Keserovic was stripped of his status as a Lawful Permanent 
Resident of the United States and ordered deported for having entered a guilty plea on advice of 
his trial counsel, Mr. McKinnie, to an offense that qualifies as an "aggravated felony" under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. The result should not have surprised Mr. Keserovic because as 
a non-citizen defendant in criminal proceedings, he is guaranteed effective counsel, which 
includes the unequivocal advice that he would be deported if he plead guilty to Petit Theft under 
LC. § 18-2407(2). Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010). Had Mr. Keserovic had 
effective assistance of counsel, he would have been advised that such a plea would most 
certainly result in his deportation. 
B. Standard of Review 
On appeal of a decision rendered by the district court acting in its appellate capacity, the 
Court directly reviews the district court's decision to determine whether it correctly decided the 
issues presented to it on appeal. Barley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176 (2010). The reviewing court 
does so under the same standards employed by the district court. Id. The Court examines the 
magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to support 
the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from 
those findings. State v. Green, 149 Idaho 706, 708 (Ct.App.2010). The issue is not whether the 
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Petitioner will prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support his claim. 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 673 (2008). 
a. Standard of Review Below 
Mr. Keserovic sought post-conviction relief to withdraw a guilty plea that he alleged was 
entered unknowingly and involuntarily because defense counsel, Mr. McKinnie, failed to 
correctly advise him about the immigration consequences of his plea. Mr. Keserovic bears the 
burden of establishing that he is entitled to post-conviction relief by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271 (Ct.App.2002). In a post-conviction petition 
based on a claim that trial counsel failed to advise or misadvised the Petitioner about the 
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, Strickland applies. Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 
1482 (2010); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
When a district court considers an appeal from a magistrate court, the district court is 
acting as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 596 (1992). The 
interpretation of law or statute is a question of law over which the Court has free review. State v. 
Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 462 (Ct.App.2000). The district court will not disturb the magistrate 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 617 
(2011). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law, 
such that the district court will defer to the magistrate court's factual findings if supported by 
substantial evidence, but will exercise free review over the application of the relevant law to 
those facts. Id. 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature. 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678 (1983); Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 830 (1969); Murray 
v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921 (Ct.App.1992). Summary dismissal of an application pursuant to 
LC. § 19-4906 is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Like a 
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plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of evidence the 
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. LC.§ 19-4907; Russell v. 
State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct.App.1990). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a 
complaint in an ordinary civil action, as an application must contain much more than "a short 
and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under LR.C.P. 8(a)(l). An 
application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal 
knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations 
must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included 
with the application. LC. § 19-4903. In other words, the application must present or be 
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject 
to dismissal. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for post-
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue 
of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. 
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763 (Ct.App.1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146 
(Ct.App.1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89 (Ct.App.1987). Summary dismissal of an 
application for post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state does not 
controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the 
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 
Idaho 156, 159 (Ct.App.1986). 
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On review of a magistrate court's dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without 
an evidentiary hearing, the district court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file; 
moreover, the district court should liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor 
of the non-moving party. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 896 (Ct.App.1993). 
C. The District Court Correctly Decided The Issue Presented On Appeal When It 
Reversed The Magistrate Court's Summary Dismissal Of Mr. Keserovic's Post-
Conviction Petition For Relief And Remanded For Evidentiary Hearing Because 
Mr. Keserovic Presented The Court With A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact And 
Provided Admissible Evidence Supporting His Claims 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the assistance of Counsel for his 
defense." U.S. CONST. AMEND VI. Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is 
entitled to "the effective assistance of competent counsel." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 
759, 771 (1970); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 686. A claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel may properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Goodwin, 138 Idaho 
at 272. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that the 
attorney's performance was deficient, and that the defendant was prejudiced by the deficiency. 
Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316 (Ct.App.1995); Russell, 118 Idaho at 67. To establish a 
deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988); see also 
Russell, 118 Idaho at 67. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable 
probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have 
been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 7 61; see also Russell l l 8 Idaho at 67. 
In the case of Padilla v. Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held that effective 
representation under the Sixth Amendment includes counseling a non-citizen defendant about the 
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immigration consequences of a conviction. 130 S.Ct. 1473. Failing to correctly advise a 
defendant regarding his potential for deportation constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel 
under Strickland. Id. at 1481. Whether a defendant is entitled to relief, is dependent upon a 
showing of prejudice that the outcome would have been different based upon accurate advice 
under Padilla. Aragon at 761. Further, prejudice from the inaccurate and misleading advice of 
counsel cannot be cured by the State or the Court as the obligation to provide accurate advice 
regarding immigration consequences falls on defense counsel. Padilla at 1486. Though 
statements from the court or the prosecutor regarding possible immigration consequences can 
play a useful role in stimulating conversation between the defendant and his attorney, they 
cannot substitute for the competent advice regarding the advisability of the guilty plea in light of 
the immigration consequences. See In re Resendiz, 25 Cal. 4th 230, 240-42 (2001); and State v. 
Paredez, 136 N.M. 533, 537-38 (2004). 
D. The District Court Correctly Held It Was Error When Mr. Keserovic Was Not 
Informed Of The Immigration Consequences Of His Guilty Plea 
The Magistrate Court correctly held that Mr. McKinnie' s inaccurate advice to 
Mr. Keserovic regarding the immigration consequences of his plea to Petit Theft constituted 
ineffective assistance. Mr. McKinnie's performance as counsel was deficient within the meaning 
of Padilla v. Kentucky because the consequence of pleading guilty to Petit Theft with a 365-day 
sentence is virtually certain deportation. 130 S.Ct. 1473. As in Padilla, a simple reading of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act would have revealed that virtually certain deportation was the 
clear consequence of pleading guilty to theft with a 365-day sentence. Padilla at 1483; see also 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (identifying theft with a one year sentence as an "aggravated felony"); 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (rendering deportable "any alien who is convicted of an aggravated 
10 
felony .... "); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (flush language) (alien inadmissible at any time if 
convicted of an aggravated felony). 
Despite its holding, the Magistrate Court indicated in a footnote that the record was 
contradictory about advice given by counsel because counsel had discussions with his client 
regarding immigration consequences. See Order, p. 3, n.1. (R. at 95). This conclusion 
presupposes that the advice was accurate and met the standard as required in Padilla. The fact 
that Mr. Keserovic and Mr. McKinnie both asserted in their respective affidavits that they 
discussed immigration issues does not mean that the advice was accurate. A discussion regarding 
immigration consequences is not enough. The advice by counsel must be accurate. Padilla, 130 
S.Ct. 1473. In this case, the District Court's affirmation of the Magistrate Court's holding was 
correct because the record is clear that Mr. McKinnie's advice was indeed inaccurate, failing to 
meet the standard of advice required by Padilla. 
E. The District Court Correctly Held That The Magistrate Court Erred When It Found 
That Mr. McKinnie's Deficient Performance Was Cured By Inaccurate Advisements 
From The Court And State's Counsel 
It is correct that Mr. Keserovic must show that Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance 
was prejudicial, but the holding that the Court and the State's attorney cured that prejudice is 
error and was properly reversed by the District Court. 
a. Mr. Keserovic Presented A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact That He Was 
Prejudiced By Mr. McKinnie's Deficient Performance 
The Magistrate Court erred when it found that Mr. Keserovic could not show that the 
result (plea) would have been different but for Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance. The 
Court's reasoning was that "[n]otice of the consequences of his plea was, according to the 
record, clearly provided." See Order, p.4. (R. at 96). The Court continues by stating that 
whatever deficiency or prejudice existed was cured prior to Defendant entering his plea. Id. The 
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Magistrate Court did not make any findings whether Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance was 
prejudicial in and of itself. Petitioner's Counsel asserted, and the District Court correctly found, 
that this lack of finding is error. (R. at 237-8). The District Court further found that there is a 
reasonable probability that Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance was prejudicial to 
Mr. Keserovic. Id. 
In the context of alleged deficiencies of counsel relating to guilty pleas, the specific 
standard for prejudice is whether "there is a reasonably probability that, but for counsel's errors, 
[the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley 
v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676 (2009). "[T]he focus is 'on the defendant's state of mind when 
choosing to plead guilty,' and there is no requirement that the Court speculate as to the potential 
sentence for a lesser charged offense should the jury convict on that basis at retrial." Booth v. 
State, 151 Idaho at 622 (quoting McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 853 (2004)). 
The Magistrate Court was presented with admissible evidence that supported the claim 
that Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance was prejudicial. Mr. Keserovic came to the United 
States lawfully as a boy and has continued to live here since. Affidavit of Keserovic, p. l. (R. at 
26). The U.S. is the sole home he knows, and his safe haven. Moreover, at the time, 
Mr. Keserovic was the father of a four year old U.S. citizen child. Id., p.2. (R. at 27). Had 
Mr. Keserovic known that he would be banished from the U.S. for the rest of his life, it is more 
than probable that he would have sought different means to resolve his case or taken his chances 
at an acquittal at trial. It would have been rational for him to reject the plea deal he ultimately 
accepted. In his affidavit, Mr. Keserovic states, "There is no question that I would not admit guilt 
to the crime if I had known that this conviction would require my deportation. If I were able to 
do it again, I would not admit guilty [sic.] to theft and would take this case to trial." Id 
Mr. Keserovic was so concerned with the immigration consequences that he raised the issue with 
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Mr. McKinnie after he had been visited in jail by an immigration officer. Id., p. l. (R. at 26). The 
evidence indicates that Mr. McKinnie's advice to Mr. Keserovic was that he could plead guilty 
to a misdemeanor without the risk of deportation. Id See also Affidavit of McKinnie, p.1. (R. at 
28). 
Alternatively, had Mr. McKinnie correctly advised Mr. Keserovic, it is probable that 
Mr. Keserovic could have negotiated a deal in which he pled to the same offense but to a 364-
day sentence, rather than a 365-day sentence. Such a sentence would have taken the crime 
outside the "aggravated felony" definition. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G). It is likely that the 
prosecutor would have agreed to a 364-day sentence, given the fact that the State agreed to 
amend the charge from a felony to a misdemeanor and further agreed to a suspension of the 
majority of the 365-day sentence. Clearly, the State was not interested in Mr. Keserovic's 
prolonged incarceration. The District Court appropriately made note of this, stating it was "not 
apparent to ... that the state would not have gone along with a slightly shorter sentence (shorter by 
one day), to accomplish this. (R. at 237). 
It is likely that the Court would have entered such a sentence, had it been presented to the 
Court as the product of a binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement between the parties. For the foregoing 
reasons, Mr. Keserovic undoubtedly suffered prejudice on account of Mr. McKinnie's deficient 
performance, but at a minimum presented a genuine issue of material fact as such. 
b. The District Court Correctly Decided That The Magistrate Court Erred When It 
Found That Any Prejudice From Counsel's Deficient Performance Was Cured By 
The State And The Court 
The Magistrate Court held that because the State and the Court alerted Mr. Keserovic to 
the possibility of deportation, that any prejudice was cured prior to Mr. Keserovic entering his 
plea of guilty. See Order, p.4. (R. at 96). The colloquy on the record, as outlined in the Court's 
order is as follows: 
13 
[PROSECUTOR:] Judge, I hate to do this to you but prior to accepting the plea of 
guilty, we just need to make it very clear on the record the State understands a 
petit theft with 365 days as being what the ICE or the federal government 
determines to be an aggravated felony even though it is a misdemeanor. It is the 
State's understating (sic) that this does subject Mr. Keserovic to deportation and 
so in entering this plea of guilty, we just want it very clear on the record that it 
does subject him to that potential. (TR pg. 4, 11-20). 
The Court then inquired of Defendant's attorney whether he and the defendant had the 
(immigration) discussion, to which Defendant's counsel replied: 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] On multiple occasions, Judge. We've talked about the 
fact that this could raise immigration issues with regard to entering a plea in this 
case. (TR pg.4, 23-25) 
The Court, addressing Defendant, inquired: 
[COURT:] So, Mr. Keserovic, you understand that by entering a plea of guilty to 
this charge this morning that it could affect your citizenship, your application for 
citizenship or your ability to work in the United States? (TR pg. 5, 1-4). 
Order, pp. 2-3. (R. at 94-5). There are two specific errors in the Court's ruling: the State and the 
Court cannot act as a replacement for the ill-advice of defense counsel as it is the burden of 
defense counsel to provide accurate advice; and, the notice of immigration consequences by the 
Court and the State in this case was insufficient under Padilla. The District Court held, in a 
footnote, that had the court or the state "explicitly informed [Mr. Keserovic] on the record that 
entering his guilty under these circumstances would subject him to mandatory deportation, this 
would have been sufficient to adequately inform him of the consequences of his plea." (R. at 
237). Petitioner-Respondent asserts that under Padilla, the accurate advice must come from trial 
counsel, not the court or state's counsel, so this issue is addressed below. Nonetheless, the 
warnings given in this case were inaccurate, and thus the District Court correctly held that trial 
counsel's deficient performance was not cured. 
1. It Is The Burden Of Defense Counsel To Provide Accurate Advice Under 
Padilla 
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Padilla makes it evident that the non-citizen defendant's right to be informed of clear 
immigration consequences derives from the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel, and so it is 
irrelevant that the court or the prosecutor may have alerted Mr. Keserovic to the consequences 
of a guilty plea. In Padilla, the Supreme Court repeatedly stated that the obligation to provide 
accurate advice regarding immigration consequences falls on defense counsel. Padilla at 1482, 
1486. Statements from the court or the prosecutor regarding possible immigration consequences 
can play a useful role in stimulating a conversation regarding immigration consequences between 
the defendant and his attorney, but they cannot substitute for competent advice regarding the 
advisability of the guilty plea in light of the immigration consequences, as required by the Sixth 
Amendment pursuant to Padilla. See Resendiz, 25 Cal.4th at 240-42 (that a defendant may have 
received valid advisements [regarding immigration consequences] from the court does not entail 
that he has received effective assistance of counsel in evaluating or responding to such 
advisements."); Paredez, 136 N.M. at 537-38 (defense attorney "is in a much better position 
[than the court] to ascertain the personal circumstances of his ... client so as to determine what 
indirect consequences the guilty plea may trigger"). The Washington Supreme Court noted that 
the Padilla decision, in highlighting court notification requirements, was "underscore[ing] 'how 
critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation."' State 
v. Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015, 1020-21 (Wash. 2011) (emphasis in original) (quoting Padilla at 
1486). Therefore, as the reasoning of the Padilla decision would be undercut by allowing court 
or prosecutor notifications to replace competent attorney advice, this Court should hold that a 
court or prosecutor notification is not an acceptable substitute for the competent advice required 
under the Sixth Amendment regarding the advisability of entering the guilty plea in light of the 
immigration consequences for several reasons. 
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The defendant is entitled to rely on his attorney's advice regarding the advisability of 
entering the guilty plea, as opposed to the court or the prosecutor's statements regarding possible 
immigration consequences, which is given without knowledge of the defendant's unique 
circumstances. Attorney competence is presumed under the Sixth Amendment. See Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 689 (courts "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance"). Therefore, the defendant can also 
presume that his attorney, who is familiar with the details of his particular situation, has provided 
competent advice. See State v. Yahya, 2011 WL 5868794 *5 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 2011) (despite 
court's statement that defendant might get deported, it "might have been reasonable for appellant 
to rely on her attorney's specific assurance that she would not be deported"); accord Ex Parte 
Solitaria, 2010 WL 2789032 (Tex. App.-Austin). This is well-illustrated in the instant case, 
where Mr. McKinnie told a concerned Mr. Keserovic that he would not be deported because his 
crime was a misdemeanor. While Mr. McK.innie's statement that Idaho petit theft is a 
misdemeanor was correct, he was absolutely incorrect in stating that the crime was not an 
aggravated felony under the immigration laws. However, his statements to Mr. Keserovic had the 
hallmark of validity because it came from counsel. Therefore, it was reasonable for 
Mr. Keserovic to rely on his attorney's erroneous advice as opposed to the court and the 
prosecutor's general statement, given without knowledge of the defendant's individual 
circumstances, which mentions the possibility of a "negative effect" on immigration status. 
Further, the court and the prosecutor's obligations under the Fifth Amendment are legally 
and practically distinct from defense counsel's responsibilities under the Sixth Amendment, and 
these distinctions render information provided during the plea colloquy and sentencing hearing 
an insufficient substitute for competent advice from the defense attorney given before the 
defendant decides to plead guilty. In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court put it thusly: 
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[H]ow can a judge, whose functions are purely judicial, effectively 
discharge the obligations of counsel for the accused? He can and should see to it 
that in the proceedings before the court the accused shall be dealt with justly and 
fairly. He cannot investigate the facts, advise and direct the defense, or participate 
in those necessary conferences between counsel and accused which sometimes 
partake of the inviolable character of the confessional. 
287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932). This cogent description of the distinct responsibilities of the judge (and, 
to some extent, the prosecutor) as opposed to defense counsel continues to reflect the functional 
division embodied in our constitutional jurisprudence, and mandates the conclusion that a court 
or prosecutorial notification regarding immigration consequences cannot substitute for 
meaningful advice from defense counsel given before the defendant decides to enter a guilty 
plea. 
Moreover, if defense counsel's failure to recogmze the immigration consequences 
prevents him from negotiating a reasonable alternative plea that eliminates or mitigates these 
consequences, court or prosecutor notifications are unavailing to cure the prejudice flowing from 
that error. The Padilla Court specifically contemplated the use of immigration consequences 
information not only to inform a defendant's choice regarding a guilty plea, but also to inform 
defense negotiation strategy: "Counsel who possess the most rudimentary understanding of the 
deportation consequences ... may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to 
craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likelihood of deportation." Id. at 1486. If the 
consequence to the defendant of counsel's failure to appreciate the immigration consequences is 
that the defendant loses the opportunity to negotiate a plea that mitigates or eliminates the 
immigration consequences, this type of prejudice is not addressed by a court or prosecutor 
notification once the negotiations have concluded. Commonwealth v. Clarke, 460 Mass. 30, 47 
(2011) (one way to demonstrate prejudice pursuant to Padilla is that "there is a reasonable 
probability that a different plea bargain (absent such consequences) could have been 
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negotiated"); People v. Bautista, 115 Cal.App.4th 229, 238-42 (2004) (defendant prejudiced by 
counsel's failure to "attempt to 'plead upward,' that is, pursue a negotiated plea for violation of a 
greater. .. offense" that carried less severe immigration consequences). Thus, the district court 
should have held that a court or prosecutor notification does not cure the prejudice that flows 
from defense counsel's failure to negotiate a reasonable resolution that mitigates or eliminates the 
immigration consequences. 
Finally, the Court should consider the context in which any judicial or prosecutorial 
warnings were given to the defendant. At the time, the State and the Court addressed 
immigration consequences in this case, Mr. Keserovic had already conferred with counsel and 
decided on pleading guilty to petit theft with a 365-day sentence. The typical criminal defendant, 
when confronted with the formality of the plea colloquy and sentencing hearing, delivered in a 
language of legalese not easily understood by laymen, is unlikely to engage in a meaningful 
dialogue with the Court or the prosecutor about the decision to accept the plea agreement. The 
average defendant is even less likely to question the advice he has received from his trusted 
counsel because of statements by a judge or prosecutor during a generally scripted proceeding. 
To the extent that the court or the prosecutor phrases the consequences in a reasonably accurate 
fashion, the defendant cannot know whether the Court or the prosecutor has gotten it right. It is 
significant to note, that in this case, when Mr. Keserovic was confronted with the statements by 
the State and the Court regarding possible immigration consequences, he leaned over to defense 
counsel and inquired about their meaning. Mr. Keserovic was told that they were just trying to 
scare him, and advised he should go forward with this plea. See Affidavit of Haris Keserovic, 
p.l. (R. at 26). Mr. McKinnie's advice at that time was to ignore the statements of the State and 
the Court, which again, was ill-advised and provided a clear implication to Mr. Keserovic that he 
would not face deportation if he pleaded guilty to petit theft with a 365-day sentence. 
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ii. The District Court Correctly Held That The State And The Court Provided 
Inaccurate Notice To The Defendant Regarding Immigration Consequences, 
Thus The Notice Is Insufficient Under Padilla 
A statement by a court or prosecutor that deportation is a "potential" consequence of a 
guilty plea does not put a defendant whose deportation is virtually certain on notice regarding the 
inevitability of deportation. Padilla at 1483 ("when the deportation consequence is truly 
clear, ... the duty to give correct advice is equally clear."); accord US. v. Bonilla, 637 F.3d 980, 
984 (9th Cir. 2011) ("A criminal defendant who faces almost certain deportation is entitled to 
know more than that it is possible that a guilty plea could lead to removal; he is entitled to know 
that it is a virtual certainty."); see also Sandoval, 249 P.3d 1015 (granting post-conviction relief 
and finding prejudice where defendant had signed a plea agreement containing warning about 
immigration consequences); Salazar v. State, No. 11-11-00029-CR, slip op. (Tex. Ct. App. Aug. 
31, 2011); State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 NJ. 129 (2009) (mandating revision of New Jersey's 
boilerplate warning to defendants that guilty plea "may" result in deportation where crime is 
aggravated felony); People v. Garcia, 907 N.Y.S.2d 398,407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (holding "the 
Court's general warning will not automatically cure counsel's failure nor ease the consequent 
prejudice"). 
In this case, the State and the Court, as quoted in the Magistrate Court's Order, advised 
Mr. Keserovic that he may face deportation based upon his guilty plea and conviction to petit 
theft with a 365-day sentence. (R. at 94-5). This advice is far from clear that Mr. Keserovic 
would face virtual certain deportation based upon his plea and conviction. If Padilla requires 
defense counsel to give correct advice regarding deportation consequences if they are truly clear 
since deportation is an integral part of the penalty that may be imposed, then how can inaccurate 
advice from the State and the Court serve as an adequate substitute? As aforementioned, the 
deportation consequences in this case were truly clear and could have been easily determined 
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from reading the removal statute. Not only was defense counsel's advice in this case incorrect, 
but the statements made by the State and the Court to Mr. Keserovic at the plea colloquy were 
incorrect. Though Petitioner asserts that notice by the State and the Court can never serve as an 
appropriate alternate to the advice of defense counsel, in this case, the statements were incorrect 
and did not have the ability to cure any prejudice from Mr. McKinnie's deficient performance. 
Because these statements were inaccurate, Mr. Keserovic was never properly advised as to the 
immigration consequences as a result of his guilty plea in this case as required by Padilla. The 
record is clear on this fact, thus the Magistrate Court erred when it held otherwise and the 
District Court correctly reversed the Magistrate Court's decision. 
F. The District Court Correctly Remanded This Case For Further Proceedings 
The Magistrate Court summarily dismissed Mr. Keserovic's Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, holding that "whether deficiency or prejudice existed" was cured by the Court and State's 
Counsel prior to his entry of a guilty plea. (R. at 96). Clearly, this holding does not include any 
findings regarding prejudice, despite the State's assertions. See Corrected Appellant's Brief, filed 
7/25/14, p.10. The District Court applied the appropriate standard of review by not making 
findings regarding prejudice, and remanding the case with orders for the Magistrate Court to 
make such findings after an evidentiary hearing. The District Court's standard of review, which 
must be applied equally by this Court, is to determine whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact, construing any disputed facts in the favor of the non-moving party. LC. § 19-4906. 
See also Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 796 (Ct.App.2012). The District Court found that the 
Magistrate Court did not make any findings regarding prejudice, and properly remanded the case 
for such findings to be made at an evidentiary hearing. 
The Appellant's Brief focuses on whether or not Mr. Keserovic can show prejudice and 
asks this court to find that Mr. Keserovic carrnot show prejudice. The applicable standard of 
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review does not allow for such a finding. As aforementioned, this Court must determine whether 
the district court was correct in finding that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
prejudice such that the lower court should have granted an evidentiary hearing. Despite the 
State's assertion, upholding the district court's decision does not mean that acceptance of the 
settlement agreement was irrational, rather that the district court correctly decided that the lower 
court did not address prejudice and since a genuine issue of material fact existed, it should have 
held an evidentiary hearing. See Corrected Appellant's Brief, p.11. 
a. This Court Must Only Look To The Appellate Record In Rendering A Decision 
This Court may only look to the record in making its decision. Green, 149 Idaho at 708. 
The State repeatedly asks this Court to consider evidence that has not been made a part of the 
record in this case. The State asks the court to consider a surveillance video that is not a part of 
the record. Corrected Appellant Brief, p. 11. The State further asks this court to consider 
Mr. Keserovic's prior criminal record. Id. at p. 12. It would be improper for this Court to 
consider extrinsic evidence not reviewed by the District Court. Because the Magistrate Court 
summarily dismissed Mr. Keserovic's petition, and further did not make any findings regarding 
prejudice, there is nothing for this Court to review regarding whether prejudice existed. Thus, it 
was proper for the district court to remand the case for evidentiary hearing on this issue. 
b. A Defense Attorney Must Fully And Accurately Advise His Or Her Client Of The 
Consequences Of A Guilty Plea 
The State asserts in its brief, that "( a ]ny defense attorney with a client who is facing 
deportation will be in a difficult position." Id. at p.13. Counsel for Petitioner-Respondent does 
not deny that the job of a defense attorney can be difficult, but there is nothing difficult about 
deciding the type of advice to give to a client. The State presents an example that amounts to 
complete nonsense because in both versions, the client is deported. Why would a defense 
21 
attorney choose to give inaccurate advice in this situation so that the defendant could later file a 
post-conviction petition? Such attorney would face disbarment, while the client would still be 
deported and have to fight the case from a foreign country. It is far from the "Robson's choice" 
that the State attempts to describe. Id. Giving inaccurate advice, as in this case, leads a client to 
deportation. It does not assist a client to avoid deportation as the State alleges. 
A defense attorney must fully and accurately advise a client as to the consequences of a 
guilty plea. Many times, a client faces two very difficult decisions. If fully and accurately 
advised, the client can make an informed decision, which is all that is constitutionally required. 
A defense attorney is not saddled with the obligation to tell the client which choice to make. 
Nonetheless, even if trial counsel in this case purposefully gave Mr. Keserovic inaccurate advice, 
Mr. Keserovic's plea was made without knowledge of the consequences. Trial counsel's 
performance would still be deficient under Strickland, and the District Court still made the 
appropriate decision to remand the case for further proceedings on the prejudice prong. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Keserovic asserted that the Magistrate Court erred when it granted summary 
dismissal of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, thereby denying him relief. The District 
Court agreed with Mr. Keserovic, and properly remanded the case for further proceedings. 
Mr. McKinnie's performance was indeed deficient and Mr. Keserovic's Sixth Amendment right 
to the effective assistance of counsel was violated. Based upon the record, the Magistrate Court 
had ample admissible evidence that presented a material issue of genuine fact even when viewed 
in favor of the non-moving party, thus the summary dismissal of his Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief was error. The Court should have held an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Keserovic respectfully 
requests this Court uphold the District Court's decision reversing the Magistrate Court and 
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remanding this case for the Magistrate Court to hold an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 19-4907. 
~ 
DATED this .dt:i_ day of August 2014. 
23 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this !dJ.a_ day of August 2014, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy thereof in the 
U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
Ms. Shawna Dunn 
Mr. James Dickinson 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 West Front Street, Suite 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Mr. Haris Keserovic 
Polje 97 
77230 Velika Kladusa 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Katie Van V orhis 
24 
